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COMMENT 
WHEN CONSIDERING WHETHER PRIOR CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE IN SUBSEQUENT CIVIL 
PROCEEDINGS AS A HEARSAY EXCEPTION, SHOULD 
MARYLAND KEEP ITS KUHL OR TAKE A WALK ON THE 
WALDSIDE? 
By: Michael Rynd* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Assume that Usama Bin Ladin has been captured, tried, and 
convicted for his role in participating in the murder of over 3,000 
people. In wrongful death suits arising after the criminal judgment, 
plaintiffs in federal court have the option under Federal Rule of 
Evidence ("FRE") 803(22) of introducing the conviction "to prove any 
fact essential to sustain the judgment."1 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has considered proposals for, but declined to adopt, a rule of 
evidence similar to FRE 803(22).2 If this hypothetical situation played 
out in Maryland state courts, the burden would exist for each 
subsequent civil suit plaintiff to redraw, for the finder of fact, all facts 
necessary to sustain Bin Ladin's culpability. Fully seventy-five 
percent of states other than Maryland have adopted rules of evidence 
substantially similar in language and intent to FRE 803(22).3 On the 
* J.D. expected May 2006, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
1. FED. R. Evm. 803(22) ("Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, 
entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), 
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 
one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when 
offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than 
impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an 
appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility."). 
2. LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 250 (2d ed. 2002). 
3. ALA. R. Evm. 803(22); ARiz. REv. STAT. R. 803(22); ARK. R. EVID. 803(22); CAL. EVID. 
CODE§ 1300; COLO. R. EVID. 803(22); DEL. R. EVID. 803(22); HAW. R. Evm. 803(22); 
IDAHO R. EVID. 803(22); IND. R. EVID. 803(22); IOWA R. EVID. 5.803(22); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 60-460(r); KY. R. EVID. 803(22); LA. CODE EVID. art. 803(22); ME. R. EVID. 
803(22); MICH. R. EVID. 803(22); MINN. R. EvrD. 803(22); MISS. R. EVID. 803(22); 
MONT. R. EVID. 803(22); NEB. R. STAT.§ 27-803(21); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 51.295; N.J. R. 
EVID. 803(22); N.M. R. Evm. ll-803V.; N.D. R. EviD. 803(22); OHIO R. EVID. 803(21); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2803(22); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.460(22); R.I. R. Evm. 803(22); 
25 
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question of admitting a prior criminal conviction as evidence in a 
subsequent civil proceeding, Maryland has definitely not followed the 
herd.4 
There is a tension between the desire for judicial economy and 
fairness to persons injured by criminal activity on one hand, and the 
need to protect traditional rights of all litigants on the other. Is a 
modified version of FRE 803(22) the answer? This article posits that 
the tension may be eased by emphasizing the judge's role as 
gatekeeper, empowered to determine relevancy and materiality and to 
balance probative value against prejudicial effect. 
In order to understand the applicability of the proposed rule it is 
imperative that it not be confused with established uses of criminal 
convictions. Under Maryland law, a witness may be impeached by a 
past conviction for an infamous crime or a crime that reflects 
negatively on the witness' credibility for truthfulness.5 A party's plea 
of guilty may come into a subsequent proceeding as an admission of a 
party opponent.6 It is essential to differentiate between proof of the 
fact of the conviction, proof of which might be admissible as a public 
record,7 and the facts essential to sustain the conviction. FRE 803(22) 
and its kin are not in place to say that Party A has been convicted of 
arson (and therefore is a three-time loser), rather to show that Party A 
set fire to his insured's building (and therefore invoked the 
exclusionary clause regarding intentional acts in the policy). 
It is helpful to retain three concepts while considering this topic. 
First, there is a long-standing tradition that a criminal should not profit 
from the fruits of his crime. It is a legitimate question to ask whether 
the party, against whom the evidence might be offered, would in the 
absence of a rule like FRE 803(22), benefit from forcing the offeror of 
the evidence tore-litigate the underlying facts necessary to sustain the 
conviction. Second, there is an equally long-standing tradition that the 
party, against whom the evidence might be offered, is entitled to have 
fully litigated all the underlying contentions. Third, nothing in the 
S.C. R. EVID. 803(22); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 19-16-26; TENN. R. EVID. 803(22); TEX. 
R. Evm. 803(22); UTAH R. EVID. 803(22); VT. R. Evm. 803(22); WASH. R. EVID. 
803(a)(22); W.VA. R. EVID. 803(22); WIS. STAT.§ 908.03(22); WYO. R. EVID. 803(22). 
4. See Stephen B. Gerald, Comment: Judgments of Prior Conviction as Substantive Proof in 
Subsequent Civil Proceedings: A Study of Admissibility and Maryland's Need for Such a 
Hearsay Exception, 29 U. BALT. L. REV. 57 (1999); Stephen J. Karina, Ford v. Ford: A 
Maryland Slayer's Statute is Long Overdue, 46 MD. L. REv. 501 (1987). 
5. MD. RULE 5-609 (a). 
6. MD. RULE 5-803(a). 
7. MD. RULE 5-803(b)(8)(A). 
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FRE 803(22) rule places it beyond the twin threshold evaluations of 
relevance and the balancing test of prejudicial effect against probative 
value. 
Part II of this comment will discuss the development of the law in 
three areas: (a) Maryland's common law dealing with the topic; (b) 
sample jurisdictions' applications of rules similar to FRE 803(22); and 
(c) Maryland's existing statutory exceptions to the exclusionary 
practice. Part III will identify the areas of concern raised in Maryland 
courts and in the rule proposal process in Maryland regarding 
admissibility of antecedent criminal convictions in subsequent civil 
proceedings. Part IV will address the concerns raised. Part V will 
propose a specific modified version of the rule. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXISTING LAW 
Maryland case law has evolved so that a criminal conviction related 
to a civil case may be proved to impeach the evidence of a party who 
testifies inconsistently with facts that were necessary to the conviction 
but not as substantive proof of those facts. Federal courts and a large 
majority of states have followed the trend away from the former 
majority rule of exclusion, towards admissibility of a conviction as 
substantive evidence of facts necessary to sustain the judgment. Even 
in Maryland, the legislature has created exceptions to the exclusionary 
practice to allow antecedent convictions into subsequent civil 
proceedings as substantive evidence. 
A. The Evolution of Maryland Case Law 
The near century-old case of Mattingly v. Montgomery8 
foreshadowed the blending of issues that can occur when using 
criminal convictions as evidence. In Mattingly, the central question 
was whether the driver of a carriage, acting as an agent of the 
defendant, had been negligent in the handling of his horse at a railroad 
crossing.9 The horse, frightened by locomotive air brakes, leaped 
wildly forward, knocking the plaintiff to the ground. 10 Appealing the 
judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant took exception to the trial 
court's admission of the evidence that the carriage driver had been 
arrested and fined for driving too fast as a result of the same 
8. 106 Md. 461, 68 A. 205 (1907). 
9. I d. at 468, 62 A. at 207. 
10. ld. at 465, 68 A. at 206. 
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incident. 11 The court held admission of the evidence was proper as 
"[t]he credibility of the witness was ... directly in issue upon a 
material point, and the fact proved tended to impair the weight of his 
evidence, and was properly admitted without the production of the 
record of conviction."12 As this line of cases developed, admissibility 
for credibility was retained while admissibility to show facts necessary 
to sustain the conviction fell by the wayside. 
Two years after Mattingly the court revisited this discussion in 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Strube. 13 Strube was returning 
home from a visit to a gypsy camp by way of tracks on a viaduct 
owned by the defendant when he was assaulted by a private detective 
in the employ of the defendant. 14 The railroad's agent, McCarron, 
testified on cross-examination that he had been convicted for beating 
Strube. 15 The appellate court considered the admissibility of this 
testimony. Citing Mattingly as directly on point, the court said "[t]he 
answer affects the weight of McCarron's testimony as to the character 
of the assault, and therefore in a sense his credibility as a witness."16 
The court appears to be looking at the facts underlying the conviction 
but limiting the scope of the testimony by applying those facts to make 
a determination regarding the witness's credibility. 
The court's reluctance to make use of a judgment as substantive 
evidence of the underlying facts continued to become more firmly 
entrenched across the subsequent decades in a line of cases whose 
authority for this approach was Strube. 17 In 1983, the court firmly 
reiterated this position in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Kuhl. 18 
11. /d. at 471, 68 A. at 208. 
12. !d. (emphasis added). 
13. 111 Md. 119, 73 A. 697 (1909). 
14. !d. at 122, 73 A. at 698. 
15. !d. at 125, 73 A. at 699. 
16. !d. at 126, 73 A. at 699 (emphasis added). 
17. See Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 86, 698 A.2d 1097, 1104 (1997) ("A criminal 
conviction is not conclusive of the facts behind it in a subsequent civil proceeding, and, 
indeed, the conviction is ordinarily not even admissible in the civil action as evidence of 
the underlying facts."); Eisenhower v. Baltimore Transit Co., 190 Md. 528, 538, 59 A.2d 
313, 319 ( 1948) ("[T]he judgment in a criminal prosecution is not competent 
evidence, to establish the truth of the facts upon which it has been rendered, in a civil 
action for damages occasioned by the offense of which the party stands convicted."); 
Gen. Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Sherby, 165 Md. I, 7, 165 A. 809, 811 (1933) (fmding that the 
case before it was "within the general rule that the judgment in the criminal prosecution 
is not competent evidence, to establish the truth of the facts upon which it has been 
rendered, in a civil action for damages occasioned by the offense of which the party 
stands convicted."). 
18. 296 Md. 446, 450,463 A.2d 822, 825 (1983). 
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While Kuhl is convoluted both factually and procedurally, the thrust of 
the court's opinions regarding the subject at hand is clear. The central 
factual issue was whether the insured driver had deliberately struck the 
victims with the vehicle he was operating. 19 
Kuhl was one of several hitchhikers picked u~ by car salesman, 
Leonard Prahl, on a late night trip to the beach. 2 After a roadside 
argument, Prahl briefly deserted his former riders?' Subsequently, 
Kuhl and a companion were struck by the company vehicle Prahl was 
driving.22 Prahl signed a written statement admitting striking the 
pedestrians, but asserted that it had been an accident.23 Prahl was 
convicted in the District Court of Maryland for Dorchester County of 
assault and battery.24 
Kuhl and the other victim sued Prahl and his employer in the 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County?5 While that suit was 
pending, the insurer filed a declaratory judgment action in the same 
court.26 At issue in the declaratory judgment action was whether Prahl 
had intended to strike the victims, thereby negating the coverage.27 A 
jury found for the insurer?8 On appeal of the declaratory judgment, 
the Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded finding that the 
trial court improperly admitted the prior conviction of assault and 
battery?9 The insurer petitioned for certiorari and the victims filed an 
answer and a conditional cross-petition?0 The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the appellate court.31 
The Court of Appeals held the trial court had improperly admitted 
the evidence of Prahl's conviction?2 The court noted the "well-settled 
rule in Maryland that a criminal conviction is inadmissible to establish 
the truth of the facts upon which it is rendered in a civil action for 
19. /d. at 450,463 A.2d at 825. 
20. /d. at 448, 463 A.2d at 824. 
21. /d. at 448, 463 A.2d at 824. 
22. /d. at 449, 463 A.2d at 824. 
23. /d. 
24. /d. 
25. /d. 
26. /d. 
27. /d. 
28. /d. 
29. ld at 450, 463 A.2d at 825. 
30. /d. 
31. /d. 
32. /d. 
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damages arising from the offense for which the person is convicted."33 
The court explained: 
The reasons for this exclusion of the judgment in a 
criminal case as evidence of the plaintiffs claim 
against the traverser are various. There is a weighty 
difference in the parties, objects, issues, procedure, and 
results in the two proceedings with different rules with 
respect to the competency of the witnesses and the 
relevancy, materiality, and weight of the testimony. In 
a civil proceeding, the act complained of is the essential 
element, but in a criminal prosecution it is the intent 
with which the act is done. 34 
Kuhl remains effective today for the premise that a judgment is not 
admissible as evidence of the facts necessary to sustain the 
conviction. 35 The application of FRE 803(22) and similarly derived 
rules of evidence in other jurisdictions fairly raises the question of 
whether Maryland's dogged adherence to this particular aspect of the 
common law is the most efficacious approach to evidence of a prior 
judgment. 
An interesting counterpoint to the weight of these decisions is the 
1931 case of the allegedly philandering Baltimore baker, Wald v. 
Wald. 36 In Wald the trial court was called upon to reconcile 
disharmonious testimony regarding the plight of the Walds' 
relationship.37 The underlying premise of both parties was that the 
other had abandoned the marital relationship.38 The husband initiated 
the action by filing a bill for absolute divorce and Mrs. Wald 
responded with a cross-bill for permanent alimony.39 On appeal, in 
light of the contradictory testimony, the appellate court relied on "one 
independent, decisive, and undisputed corroborative fact which is 
convincing proof of the guilt of the husband."40 Mr. Wald had been 
33. !d. at 450, 463 A.2d at 825. (citing Eisenhower v. Bait. Transit Co., 190 Md. 528, 59 
A.2d 313 (1948); Galusca v. Dodd, 189 Md. 666, 57 A.2d 313 (1948); Gen. Exch. Ins. 
Corp. v. Sherby, 165 Md. 1, 165 A. 809 (1933); Pugaczeweka v. Maszko, 163 Md. 355, 
163 A. 205 (1932); Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Strube, Ill Md. 119, 73 A. 697 (1909)). 
34. !d. at 450-51,463 A.2d at 825 (quoting Gen'l Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Sherby, 165 Md. 1, 165 
A. 809, at 811 (1933) (citing Wharton's Criminal Evidence§§ 570-570d (lOthed.)). 
35. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Carter, !54 Md. App. 400,409, 840 A.2d 161, 167 (2003). 
36. 161 Md. 493, 159 A. 97 (1931). 
37. /d.at495,159A.at98. 
38. !d. at 495-96, !59 A. 98-99. 
39. !d. at 495, 159 A. at 98. 
40. !d. at 497, 159 A. at 99. 
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convicted of desertion and non-support on more than one occasion.41 
The court held the "repeated judgments are convincing evidence of the 
husband's wrongful abandonment of the wife."42 
The Kuhl court distinguished W aid when the insurer cited the case, 
noting only that there had been no objection raised to the testimony of 
the convictions at the original Wald trial.43 Regarding the lack of 
objection, the Wald appellate court said "the testimony must be given 
its effect, which is clearly that the husband was prosecuted for 
desertion, accompanied by non-support, of the wife."44 The appellate 
Wald court, noting the absence of an objection, made equitable use of 
the facts underlying the judgment in order to arrive at a fair solution.45 
The steady track in Maryland case law, apart from Wald, may be 
contrasted with dissimilar developments in other jurisdictions. 
B. A Sampling of Other Jurisdictions 
The cases discussed below illustrate how other jurisdictions have 
justified the alternative approach. Case law permitting evidence of 
prior judgments has not only been used for the inferences available 
about the underlying facts necessary to sustain a conviction, but also to 
conclusive effect regarding the specific issues presented. FRE 803(22), 
other similar rules, and the proposed rule outlined below, do not go 
that far. Rather the intent of these rules remains to introduce the prior 
judgment as evidence to assist the trier-of-fact in making a 
determination regarding the issues whose relevance encompasses both 
proceedings. 
An early entry in the trend towards admissibility may be found in 
the 1927 Virginia decision of Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. 
Co. v. Heller.46 In Heller the Supreme Court of Virginia considered 
the issue of whether a criminal conviction for arson could be used in a 
subsequent civil proceeding as evidence against the convicted 
insured.47 The insurance company was the defendant in an action 
brought by Heller to enforce his policy.48 The trial court, in line with 
the common law of the day, held that the prior conviction was of no 
41. ld at 498, 159 A. at 99. 
42. ld 
43. Kuhl, 296 Md. at 451, 463 A.2d at 825 (1983). 
44. Wald, 161 Md. at 498, !59 A. at 99 (1931 ). 
45. ld at 498, 159 A. at 99. 
46. 140 S.E. 314 (Va. 1927). 
47. Id at 315. 
48. ld 
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consequence for the jury hearing the civil case.49 On appeal, the 
Virginia Supreme Court reversed.50 The court found relevance in the 
judicially determined "fact of guilt" especially when "it is also the 
precise fact in issue in the civil case."51 The court stated that "rigid 
adherence to a general rule and to some judicial expressions would be 
a reproach to the administration of justice."52 In reaching its 
conclusion, the court addressed many questions that continue to be 
raised today, including differing burdens of proof, 53 mutuality,54 and 
the fullness of the prior litigation. 55 The court held that logic, fairness, 
and public policy all argued for giving the prior conviction conclusive 
effect. 56 
In a pre-Federal Rules of Evidence decision in Connecticut Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Farrara, 57 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit addressed: "whether or not a criminal conviction may 
49. /d.at315. 
50. /d. at 323. 
51. /d.at316. 
52. /d. at 315. 
53. See id. at 316 ("It is perfectly logical to hold in such cases that if the offender has been 
acquitted in the criminal prosecution, that acquittal should not bind another party who, 
for a personal injury arising out of the same occurrence, seeks redress in a civil action; 
and this because the prosecution may have failed merely because the guilt of the accused 
was not proved beyond any reasonable doubt. As has been frequently said, the acquittal 
of one accused of crime is only a finding that his guilt has not been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This reason, however, seems to fail where there is a conviction, and the 
fact of guilt (when it is also the precise fact in issue in the civil case) has been judicially 
determined, because the plaintiff in the civil action is only bound to prove that fact by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, as the greater includes the less, we can see no 
logical reason, considering the question from this point of view, why the conviction 
should not be admissible, certainly as relevant evidence for the consideration of the 
jury."). 
54. See id. ("[T]he same rule of exclusion applies to convictions as to acquittals, the reason 
given being that the parties not being the same there is the consequent lack of mutuality. 
[citations omitted]. It is certainly clear in such cases that the plaintiff who is seeking 
redress in tJ-.~ civil case for the injury, not having been a party to the criminal 
prosecution, is not bound by its result. We confess our inability to perceive, however, 
why the accused person himself should not be held either as bound or affected by the 
result of the prosecution, if adverse to him."). 
55. See id. ("He has had his day in court, with the opportunity to produce his witnesses, to 
examine and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, and to appeal from the 
judgment."). 
56. See id. at 321 ("The rule of exclusion is a shield for the protection of those who have had 
no opportunity to assert their defense. To apply it here would be to convert it into a 
sword in the hands of one who has had such an opportunity, to be used by him for the 
effectuation of the same fraud which has been established, condemned and punished in 
the criminal case. If there be a rule which cannot stand the test of reason, it is a bad 
rule."). 
57. 277 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1960). 
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be considered in a subsequent civil proceeding for the purpose of 
establishing the truth of the facts upon which it was based."58 Farrara 
arose from an incident in Missouri and dealt with an insured's claim in 
federal district court for benefits from two policies written on property 
which the insured had been convicted of burning. 59 The insurers filed 
a declaratory action regarding their liability in the federal court at the 
same time the insured attempted to recover on the policies in state 
court. 60 The state civil suit was consolidated in federal court with the 
declaratory action.61 Because the insurers raised the conviction on 
cross-examination while the prior criminal judgment was being 
appealed, the district court initially found for the insured.62 When the 
insured's conviction was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court, the 
0 h 0 0 h 63 msurer soug t to revisit t e matter. 
The federal court noted the common law of Missouri had held that 
a criminal judgment could not be used "in a subsequent civil 
proceeding for the purpose of establishing the truth of the facts upon 
which it was based."64 The Court of Appeals looked to other 
jurisdictions that had expressed traditional concerns such as that "civil 
proceedings differ as to the issues, objects and procedures involved."65 
The court distinguished the instant case from the common law 
tradition by citing the fact that the insured had instituted the action. 66 
The court noted strong public policy arguments for the twin 
propositions that criminals should not benefit from the fruits of their 
crimes and that to hold otherwise would diminish confidence in the 
judicial process. 67 The court also addressed the weight to be given the 
evidence. The court found the conviction affirmed by the Missouri 
Supreme Court to not only be admissible, but to be conclusive, so that 
there was no need tore-litigate the insured's culpability.68 
58. !d. at 390. 
59. /d. at 389 (citing State v. Farrara, 320 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 1958)). 
60. Id at 389. 
61. /d. 
62. !d. 
63. Id at 389-90. 
64. /d. at 390 (citations omitted). 
65. Id (citing W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Conviction or Acquittal as Evidence of the Facts on 
Which it Was Based in Civil Action, 18 A.L.R.2D 1287 (1951)). 
66. /d. at 390. 
67. /d. at 390-92. It is the opinion of the author that both arguments lend credence to the 
position that the proposed rule is fairly applicable even in circumstances where the 
convicted party has not instituted the action. 
68. !d. at 392. (holding "if public policy demands that a criminal be not allowed to profit by 
his crime and considering the fact that the criminal judgment was based upon a burden of 
34 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 36 
A similar result, affording a conviction conclusive effect, was 
reached in Arkansas, despite a common law tradition similar to 
Maryland's and Missouri's. In Zinger v. Terrel/, 69 the Supreme Court 
of Arkansas "effectively overruled Arkansas' common law position 
that a judgment in a criminal prosecution was not admissible in a 
subsequent civil suit to prove the facts upon which it was based."70 
Zinger, already convicted of murdering her mother, sought review of 
a grant of summary judgment in favor of Terrell, the administratrix of 
the victim's estate.71 The trial court held, and the Arkansas Supreme 
Court affirmed, that Zinger's conviction precluded her claim to any 
life insurance proceeds from her mother's estate. 72 The Arkansas 
Supreme Court cited the enhanced rights of criminal defendants as part 
of the rationale justifying a break with the common law. 73 The court 
went on to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel74 and held that "a 
defendant who has been adjudged guilty of murdering a person is 
collaterally estopped from re-litigating that same issue in a later civil 
proceeding to inherit or take the victim's property."75 
proof requiring guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, there seems little justification for 
allowing the civil tribunal to reach a conclusion inconsistent with that policy. The facts 
of this case are such, however, that it is unnecessary for us to decide this issue. The 
opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Ferrara reveals clearly that the 
evidence adduced at the criminal proceeding was fully as complete as that presented in 
this action. No basis for a collateral attack on the validity of that judgment appears. 
Thus, even accepting the majority rule that a criminal conviction is only additional 
evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding, we hold in this case that any conclusion of the 
finder of fact, having been apprised of this conviction, that this fire was not due to the act 
and design of the insured would be unsupported by substantial evidence and would 
demand reversal by us."). 
69. 985 S.W.2d 737 (Ark. 1999). 
70. Ray B. Schlegel, Case Note: Zinger v. Terrell: The Collateral Estoppel Effect of 
Criminal Judgments in Subsequent Civil Litigation: New Law in Arkansas and the 
Questions Unanswered, 54 ARK. L. REV. 127 (2001). 
71. Zinger, 985 S.W.2d at 738 (Ark. 1999). 
72. !d. 
73. !d. at 740. 
74. !d. at 741 ("The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion bars there-litigation of 
issues of law or fact actually litigated by the parties in the first suit, provided that the 
party against whom the earlier decision is being asserted has a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue in question and that issue is essential to the judgment (citations omitted). 
The following elements must be shown in order to establish collateral estoppel: (I) the 
issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior litigation; (2) 
the issue must have been actually litigated; (3) the issue must have been determined by a 
final and valid judgment; and (4) the issue must have been essential to the judgment 
(citations omitted). We hold that a defendant who has been adjudged guilty of murdering 
a person is collaterally estopped from re-litigating that same issue in a later civil 
proceeding to inherit or take the victim's property."). 
75. Id. at 741. 
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There are several recurring themes in these cases. All three broke 
from the common law, due to public policy arguments based on 
fairness, logic, and evolving judicial doctrines. 76 In each case, the 
prior conviction had a conclusive effect in the subsequent civil 
proceeding. 77 The proposed rule, like its existing counterparts, is not 
intended to inevitably preclude rebuttal. 
In Gines- Vega v. Crowley American Transport, Inc., 78 the United 
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico considered the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment grounded on a conviction 
held to be admissible under FRE 803(22).79 In Gines- Vega, a civil suit 
followed a multi-vehicle accident resulting in the death of four 
people. 80 The driver of the tractor, hauling the trailer owned by 
Crowley, pled guilty and was convicted of four counts of involuntary 
manslaughter.81 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the 
convictions were determinative on the issue of negligence stating, "To 
admit the evidence is not, however, to render it conclusive of the 
question of liability."82 The court affirmed the intent behind the rule 
that the parties against whom the evidence is offered have the 
opportunity "[t]o rebut such evidence by offering whatever 
explanation there may be concerning either the circumstances 
surrounding the conviction or the underlying event. ... The ultimate 
weight to be afforded to evidence of conviction is for the trier of fact 
to determine."83 Given the weight of the evidence, the effect is 
appropriately delegated to the trier of fact. While circumstance may 
result in a preclusive effect, the result of admitting a conviction is not 
predetermined by the proposed rule. 
C. Existing Maryland Exceptions to the Exclusionary Practice 
For similar public policy reasons, the Maryland legislature has 
given criminal convictions an effect in subsequent civil proceedings 
across a wide range of circumstances in Maryland. These include the 
following circumstances whereby the common law slayer's rule might 
76. See Heller, 140 S.E. 314 (Va. 1927); Farrara, 277 F.2d 388 (81h Cir. 1960); Zinger, 985 
S.W.2d 737 (Ark. 1999). 
77. Id. 
78. 178 F.R.D. 351 (P.R. 1981). 
79. Jd. at 355. 
80. Jd. at 351. 
81. Jd. at 353. 
82. Jd. at 355. 
83. Jd. (quoting MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6773, at 492 
(1997)). 
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previously have been invoked;84 a disciplinary action before the 
Attorney Grievance Commission related to criminal activity giving 
rise to the petition for discipline;85 third party actions by victims of 
defendants convicted of violations of anti-trust law;86 and actions 
before the State Ethics Commission regarding a criminal conviction in 
connection with lobbying activities. 87 Additionally, a criminal 
conviction of another may be offered as exculpatory substantive 
evidence by a defendant where the crime is of the nature that only one 
actor could have committed the offense.88 The various statutes are 
motivated by concerns of fairness, integrity of criminal convictions, 
easing the burden on the litigants, and enhancing the impact of the 
conviction. 89 The weight of the prior convictions is generally of 
greater impact than mere admissibility as evidence.90 The language 
used offers the convictions conclusive effect resulting in a form of 
collateral estoppel applied to the underlying issues.91 
The statutory response enhancing Maryland's common law slayer's 
rule was accomplished when the legislature responded to a frustrating 
judicial conundrum.92 James Finneyfrock murdered his parents, was 
convicted of the crimes, then sued the family estate for benefits from 
the victims' insurance.93 Common law prevented Finneyfrock's 
conviction from being offered into evidence in the subsequent civil 
trial as proof of the central issue of Finneyfrock's culpability.94 The 
bare logic of the circumstances prompted the General Assembly to 
act.95 The result was statutory leave for the courts to admit prior 
convictions as conclusive evidence in slayer's rule cases.96 
84. See infra text accompanying notes 92-96. 
85. See infra text accompanying notes 97 -Ill. 
86. See infra text accompanying notes 112-122. 
87. See infra text accompanying notes 123-126. 
88. See infra text accompanying notes 127-132. 
89. See generally infra text accompanying notes 92-132. 
90. /d. 
91. /d. 
92. See Memorandum from Lynn McLain on Court of Appeals Hearing on 141'1 Report of 
the Rules Committee: Proposed Evidence Rules 5-803(b)(22) and Committee Note to 
Rule 5-702 (Dec. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Memorandum on 141 st Report of the Rules 
Committee) (on file with author). 
93. /d. 
94. /d. 
95. /d. 
96. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-919 (2005). 
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Maryland Rule 16-711 (g) gives conclusive weight to prior criminal 
convictions when adjudicating petitions for disciplinary action related 
to criminal conduct by an attorney.97 The effect is the same regardless 
of whether the conviction results from a verdict at trial, a guilty plea, 
or a plea of nolo contendere.98 
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mandel, 99 the court applied 
the predecessor to the current rule to conclusive effect. The Court of 
Appeals held "in disciplinary matters a final judgment by a judicial 
tribunal in another proceeding convicting an attorney of a crime is 
conclusive proof of the guilt of the attorney of that crime."100 The 
respondent, former Maryland governor Marvin Mandel, was convicted 
after a federal trial, of mail fraud and racketeering. 101 In response to a 
challenge to the underlying conviction, the state court noted the 
respondent's guilt had been established beyond a reasonable doubt and 
that there was no constitutional mandate tore-litigate the issue. 102 The 
court also noted there was no preclusion of evidence of mitigating 
f: h b d. . 1" h . 103 actors at t e su sequent tsctp mary eanng. 
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Tayback, 104 the rule factored 
into an attorney's suspension from the practice of law following his 
guilty plea for willful failure to file income tax returns. The Court of 
Appeals held that the guilty plea prevented the respondent from 
asserting that his actions were not willfu1. 105 The Court noted that the 
integrity of a criminal conviction is a factor that "cannot be attacked in 
97. MD. RULE 16-771 (g) ("Conclusive effect of final conviction of crime. In any proceeding 
under this Chapter, a final judgment of any court of record convicting an attorney of a 
crime, whether the conviction resulted from a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or a verdict 
after trial, is conclusive evidence of the guilt of the attorney of that crime. As used in 
this Rule, "final judgment" means a judgment as to which all rights to direct appellate 
review have been exhausted. The introduction of the judgment does not preclude the 
Commission or Bar Counsel from introducing additional evidence or the attorney from 
introducing evidence or otherwise showing cause why no discipline should be 
imposed."). 
98. !d. 
99. Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Mandel, 294 Md. 560, 571,451 A.2d 910, 915 (1982) 
(applying MD. Rule BVIO e 1). 
100. /d. at 569, 451 A.2d at 914. 
101. /d. at 562-63, 451 A.2d at 911. 
102. See id. at 571-72, 451 A.2d at 915-16 (quoting Md. State Bar Ass'n v. Rosenberg, 273 
Md. 351, 354-55, 328 A.2d 106, 108 (1972) (applying MD. RULE BV4 f 1)). 
103./d. 
104. 378 Md. 578, 590, 837 A.2d 158,165 (2003) (citing Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Barnes, 
286 Md. 474,487, 408 A.2d 719, 722 (1979)). 
105. !d. 
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a disciplinary proceeding by invoking this Court to re-weigh or to re-
evaluate the respondent's guilt or innocence."106 
In Maryland State Bar Ass 'n. v. Agnew, 107 both the Court and the 
defendant recognized a plea of nolo contendere as "conclusive proof 
of his guilt of the crime charged."108 Following a nolo contendere 
plea to a felony charge of willfully filing a fraudulent income tax 
return, Agnew unsuccessfully argued against the recommendation of a 
three-judge panel that he be disbarred. 109 The Court gave the plea full 
weight as evidence of a crime involving moral turpitude and 
constituting "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice."110 
Agnew was disbarred. 111 
When a civil proceeding arises from the same events that resulted 
in a prior criminal conviction, the plaintiff frequently replaces the state 
as the adversary of the defendant in the civil action. Lack of mutuality 
is frequently mentioned as a factor weighing against admission of 
prior convictions as evidence in subsequent civil proceedings. 112 The 
Maryland legislature has set aside mutuality concerns by providing 
that a criminal conviction for violations of the anti-trust laws may be 
considered "prima facie evidence against the defendant in an action for 
damages brought by another party."113 By legislative intent, 114 the 
Maryland statute parallels the federal antitrust law. 115 By the plain 
106. Tayback, 378 Md. at 590, 837 A.2d at 165 (quoting Bar Ass'n of Bait. City v. Siegel, 275 
Md. 521, 527, 340 A.2d 710, 713 (1975)). 
107.271 Md. 543,318 A.2d 811 (1974). 
108./d. at 548,318 A.2d at 814. 
109./d. 
110./d. at 547,318 A.2d at 813. 
Ill. /d. at 553-54, 318 A.2d at 817. 
112. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
113. Mo. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW § 11-210 (2003) ("Judgment as evidence. (a) In general. -
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a final judgment or decree rendered 
in a criminal proceeding or civil action brought by the Attorney General under this 
subtitle to the effect that a defendant has violated this subtitle is prima facie evidence 
against the defendant in an action for damages brought by another party against him 
under § 11-209(b) with respect to all matters where the judgment or decree would be an 
estoppel between the parties to it. 
(b) Exception. - This section does not apply to a civil consent judgment or decree entered 
before any testimony is taken."). 
114. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Burch, 29 Md. App. 430,436, 349 A.2d 279,283 (1975) ("It is the 
intent of the General Assembly that in construing the Maryland Antitrust Act courts be 
guided by the interpretation given by the federal courts to federal antitrust acts."). 
115. 15 U.S.C.S. § 16. ("Judgments. (a) Prima facie evidence; collateral estoppel. A final 
judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding 
brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a 
defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in 
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language of both federal and Maryland statutes, third parties may 
benefit from a collateral estoppel effect of a prior judgment.116 
Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors117 is illustrative ofboth the 
intent behind the federal statute and a broad reading of the weight of 
the conviction in a subsequent proceeding. In Emich, the court 
considered whether evidence of a prior criminal conviction for 
restraint of trade was properly admitted in a subsequent civil 
proceeding for damages resulting from the criminal behavior. 118 
Respondents General Motors and General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation had applied questionable practices in an effort to force 
dealerships to promote financing revenue. 119 The court noted a goal 
of the statute was to "minimize the burdens of litigation for injured 
private suitors by making available to them all matters previously 
established by the Government in antitrust actions."120 In evaluating 
the appropriate use of the conviction by the trial court, the court said: 
The evidentiary use which may be made under § 5 of 
the prior conviction of respondents is thus to be 
determined by reference to the general doctrine of 
estoppel. . . . Accordingly, we think plaintiffs are 
entitled to introduce the prior judgment to establish 
prima facie all matters of fact and law necessarily 
decided by the conviction and the verdict on which it 
was based. 121 
In remanding the case, the court placed the burden on and the 
discretion with the civil trial judge to examine the record of the 
any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said 
laws as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as 
between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent 
judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken. Nothing contained in 
this section shall be construed to impose any limitation on the application of collateral 
estoppel, except that, in any action or proceeding brought under the antitrust laws, 
collateral estoppel effect shall not be given to any finding made by the Federal Trade 
Commission under the antitrust laws or under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act (15 U.S.C.S. § 45] which could give rise to a claim for relief under the antitrust 
laws.") (brackets in original). 
116. See supra notes 97 & 99. 
117.340 u.s. 558 (1951). 
118. /d. at 559. 
119. !d. 
120. !d. at 568 (citing H.R. REP. No. 627 (1914); S. REP. No. 698 (1914); 51 CONG. REc. 9270, 
9490, 13851 (1914)). 
121. !d. at 568-69. 
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antecedent case and utilize jury instructions in arriving at a 
detennination of the issues decided by the prior judgment. 122 
Under Maryland law, the state agency empowered to regulate 
lobbying activities may suspend an individual's registration as a 
lobbyist if the lobbyist "has been convicted of a criminal offense 
arising from lobbying activities."123 By the language of the statute, 
the actions of the State Ethics Commission may be taken following a 
detennination of the nature of the underlying issues of the conviction 
in their relationship to lobbying activities. 124 The facts underlying the 
conviction are not re-litigated. The Commission merely accepts the 
detennination of the earlier judgment. In State Ethics Commission v. 
Evans, 125 the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that the use of a 
prior conviction under the statute would further the purpose of 
promoting the Commission's regulatory powers. 126 
Finally, the Maryland legislature has said that a prior conviction of 
a third party may be offered by a defendant in the circumstance where 
only one actor could have committed the offense. 127 The purpose 
behind the statute was described in State v. Joynes. 128 In Joynes, two 
neighborhood combatants fought over loud music. Joynes' attempt to 
introduce evidence of the neighbor's battery conviction was denied at 
trial. 129 Joynes' counsel's intent was to use the neighbor's conviction 
122. ld. at 571-72. 
123. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T.15-405(e)(1)(2003). 
124. I d. ("(1) If the Ethics Commission determines it necessary to protect the public interest 
and the integrity of the governmental process, the Ethics Commission may issue an order 
to: (i) suspend the registration of an individual regulated lobbyist if the Ethics 
Commission determines that the individual regulated lobbyist: 
1. has knowingly and willfully violated Subtitle 7 of this title; or 
2. has been convicted of a criminal offense arising from lobbying activities; or 
(ii) revoke the registration of an individual regulated lobbyist if the Ethics Commission 
determines that, based on acts arising from lobbying activities, the individual regulated 
lobbyist has been convicted of bribery, theft, or other crime involving moral turpitude."). 
125. 382 Md. 370, 855 A.2d 364 (2004) (holding under the factual circumstances, the law, 
which became effective Nov. 1, 2001, could not be applied retroactively). 
126. Jd. at 365, 855 A.2d at 375 (describing the recommendations of the Study Commission 
on Lobbyist Ethics, the body whose findings gave rise to the legislation, as "[A] number 
of statutory changes designed to prohibit certain specific practices and provide greater 
regulati • .m of lobbying activities and more effective enforcement of the regulatory 
requirements."). 
127. Mo. CODE ANN., CTs. & Juo. PROC. § 10-904 (2005) ("Proof of other's convictions. In a 
civil or criminaL case in which a person is charged with commission of a crime or act, 
evidence is admissible by the defendant to show that another person has been convicted 
of committing the same crime or act."). 
128. 314 Md. 113, 549 A.2d 380 (1988). 
129. Jd. at 118, 549 A.2d at 382. 
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as proof that Joynes was not the aggressor. 130 Ultimately, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the denial by the trial judge holding the statute did 
not apply under the circumstances and that "because of the serial 
nature of the altercation," it was reasonable to find that there may have 
been more than one offense. 131 The statute would apply only to 
preclude an obviously problematic result of convicting two parties of a 
crime only one could have committed. 132 
There exists a broad range of circumstances where judgments are 
given a range of effects in Maryland. This raises the question of why 
there is reluctance to eliminate the common law exclusionary practice. 
III. RESERVATIONS IN MARYLAND REGARDING 
ADMISSIBILITY 
The Court of Appeals twice declined the recommendations of the 
Court's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
("Rules Committee") to adopt an 803(22)-type rule. 133 Some 
objections to the proposed rule stem from Maryland's case law while 
additional reservations were articulated during the consideration of the 
proposed evidence rules. 
The Kuhl court, considered the admissibility of the judgment in a 
criminal proceeding as evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding, and 
identified as areas of concern the following differences between the 
two proceedings: issues, procedure, results of the proceedings, rules 
with respect to competency of the witnesses, and parties (raising the 
concept of mutuality). 134 The court was also concerned with 
"relevancy, materiality, and the weight of the testimony."135 These 
themes are consistent in Maryland appellate case law from 1933136 
through 2003. 137 
The Court of Appeals also has considered the proposed rule change 
in two separate public hearings. The first was conducted on October 4 
and 5, 1993, when it considered adoption of Title 5 of the Maryland 
130. ld. 
131. Jd. at 121, 549 A.2d at 384-85. 
132. Jd. at 121, 549 A.2d at 383-84 (citing Gray v. State, 221 Md. 286, 290, 157 A.2d 261, 
264 ( 1990) (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 142 
(3d ed. 1983)). 
133. LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE STATE AND FEDERAL§ 803(22):1 (West 2002). 
134. See supra note 34. 
135.Jd. 
136. Gen. Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Sherby, 165 Md. 1, 7, 165 A. 809, 811 (1933). 
137. See supra note 35. 
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Rules of Procedure as set forth in the Rules Committee's One Hundred 
Twenty-Fifth Report to the Court. 138 The Court, by its order of 
December 15, 1993, adopted Title 5 of the Maryland Rules as 
recommended by the Rules committee, which has declined to include 
Rule 803(22) in the recommendation. 139 During the second public 
hearing on January 7, 1999, the court considered proposed rule 
changes, including the recommendation to add 5-803(22) as set forth 
in the Rules Committee's One Hundred and Forty-First Report to the 
Court. 140 The court remanded the proposed rule to the Rules 
Committee for further study. 141 
The concerns of the court raised during the October, 1993 hearing 
may be discerned from the audio tape of the proceeding. 142 The court 
noted adoption of the proposed rule would result in a significant 
departure from existing Maryland common law. 143 The court was 
troubled by proposed language144 applying the rule when judgments 
were punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year. 145 Examples 
of potential problems included the following: the effect of recidivist 
statutes that enhanced penalties for repeat offenders (presumably 
asking: Did this qualify as beyond the one year mark, if the underlying 
crime, absent recidivism, would not?); when payment of a fine 
resulted in a finding of guilt (presumably asking: Had the underlying 
issue been fully litigated?); when a party made a technical guilty plea 
with an agreed statement of facts (presumably asking: Was that party, 
in fact, agreeing to the truth of these facts?). 146 
138. 20 Md. Reg. I (July 23, 1993). 
139.21 Md. Reg. I (Jan. 7, 1994). 
140. 25 Md. Reg. 1745 (Nov. 20, 1998). 
141. 26 Md. Reg. 263, 264 (Feb. 12, 1999). 
142. Audio tape: Court of Appeals of Maryland Public Hearing to Consider the One Hundred 
Twenty-Fifth Report of the Court's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (Oct. 4-5, 1993) [hereinafter Hearing Audio Tape (1993)]. 
143. Hearing Audio Tape (1993), supra note 142. 
144. Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure, !25th Report, 
Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure: Evidence (Dec. 1993). ("Judgment of 
Previous Conviction [Vacant], Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon 
a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a 
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact 
essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the State, in a 
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons 
other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown, but it does not 
preclude admissibility. [There is no subsection 22.]"). 
145. Hearing Audio Tape (1993), supra note 139. 
146. Hearing Audio Tape (1993), supra note 139. 
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Prior to submitting the One Hundred Forty-First Report the Rules 
Committee had several occasions to reconsider the proposed rule. It 
came to the attention of the Rules Committee that several civil cases 
involving the slayer's rule (prior to passage of Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 
Code Ann. § 1 0-919) had recently been through the courts, creating an 
opportune time to resubmit the proposed rule. 147 A revised rule was 
adopted by the Rules Committee with the intent to resubmit the 
148 proposed rule to the Court of Appeals. A further change was made 
to the proposed rule by adding a cross-reference when the slayer's rule 
149 
statute passed. 
At a public hearing on January 7, 1999, the Court of Appeals 
considered the newly proposed language. 150 The court again 
expressed concern regarding the length of time required for potential 
punishment of the criminal judgment before the rule kicked in. 151 The 
court noted a discrepancy between what it perceived as the intent of 
the federal rule (that is, the rule becomes effective upon punishment 
for a felony) and the possible creeping effect of lesser crimes that 
would come within the purview of the rule if sentences for minor 
crimes, through statutory adjustment, resulted in enhanced sentences 
beyond one year. 152 A question was raised regarding reconciling the 
language of the rule with the need to demonstrate convictions of a 
third party as an element of the crime with which the defendant was 
charged (for example, cases of conspiracy or as an accessory before or 
after the fact). 153 A further question was raised as to the standard of 
147. Meeting Mins., Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure 
39 (Nov. 21, 1997). 
148. Meeting Mins., Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure 
51 (Feb. 13, 1998). 
149. Meeting Mins., Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure 
61 (Sep. 11, 1998). 
150. 25 Md. Reg. 1762 (Nov. 20, 1998) ("5-803(22) [Vacant] Judgment of Previous 
Conviction. [There is no subsection 22.] Evidence of a final judgment entered after a 
trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere) that adjudges a 
person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year 
offered to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment. In criminal cases, the State 
may not offer evidence of a judgment against persons other than the accused, except for 
purposes of impeachment. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not 
preclude admissibility."). 
151. Audio tape: Court of Appeals of Maryland Public Hearing to Consider the One Hundred 
Forty-First Report of the Court's Standing Committee on Rule of Practice and Procedure 
(Jan. 7, 1999) [hereinafter: Hearing Audio Tape (1999)]. 
152. Hearing Audio Tape (1999), supra note 158. 
153. Hearing Audio Tape (1999), supra note 158. 
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finality of judgment as it applied to the proposed rule. 154 The court 
elected to remand the proposal to the Rules Committee for 
"d . f h . . d 155 cons1 erahon o t e questions raise . 
All the concerns raised, historically in the common law and 
recently in the rule proposal process, deserve to be addressed. They 
fall into five categories: 1) questions of differing issues, differing 
parties and whether an issue is fully litigated; 2) questions of 
relevancy, materiality, and weight of the evidence; 3) questions 
regarding what triggers the application of the hearsay exception; 4) 
questions regarding procedural issues, nature of the results, 
competency; and 5) questions regarding the departure from the 
common law. 
IV. RESERVATIONS ADDRESSED 
A. Issues, Parties and the Fullness of Prior Litigation 
Questions of differing issues, differing parties and whether an issue 
is fully litigated are best understood when viewed from the parallel 
framework of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In a discussion of 
collateral estoppel effects of judgments (a standard which should be 
higher than the mere admission of evidence) within the broader 
context of Maryland civil procedure, Professors Lynch and Bourne 
have written, "It is difficult to see that any public policy is furthered 
by permitting a wrongdoer to expend judicial resources re-litigating 
what the state has already proved."156 
In effect, what the proponents of evidence under FRE 803(22)-type 
rules would be attempting is a modified form of non-mutual offensive 
collateral estoppel. A party that was not party to the first proceeding is 
drawing on the antecedent action to offer evidence of facts necessarily 
decided, in an effort to convince the trier of fact in the second 
proceeding that there is no need to offer further proof of the 
underlying issues. Nothing in the proposed rule bars the litigant 
against whom the evidence is offered from challenging the evidence. 
Collateral estoppel, in other circumstances, would of course bar the 
litigation. The rule, however, allows the issue to enter into the 
subsequent proceeding for, in the words of the Advisory Committee 
154. Hearing Audio Tape (1999), supra note 158. 
155. Hearing Audio Tape (1999), supra note 158. 
!56. JOHN LYNCH & RICHARD BOURNE, MODERN MARYLAND CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 12.3(d)(6) 
(2d ed. 2002). 
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commenting on the federal rules, "what it is worth."157 While not 
every other state has adopted this view, nearly three out of every four 
have. 158 
The predicate circumstances that apply to a determination of 
whether there is a valid collateral estoppel effect also may be applied 
to a determination whether the facts necessary to sustain the 
conviction should be permitted as evidence through the vehicle of 
introducing the antecedent conviction in a subsequent proceeding. 
The first necessary circumstance is that the "particular issue must have 
been actually decided in the prior adjudication."159 The second 
circumstance is that "issue must have been an ultimate fact necessary 
. h . d . . ,160 
m t e pnor ec1s10n 
In Ferrell v. State, 161 the court conducted an extensive discussion 
of collateral estoppel in light of the State's making a fourth attempt to 
convict the same individual of a single armed robbery. 162 Judge 
Eldridge, writing for the court, set a standard for determining whether 
an issue was ripe for re-litigation based on a thorough examination of 
the record of the prior proceeding. 163 Similarly, proper use of 
proposed rule 5-803(22) would require the proponent of the conviction 
as evidence to proffer that the facts the conviction was offered to 
prove (1) were actually decided, (2) were necessary to the prior 
conviction, and (3) are relevant to the subsequent civil proceeding. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals, Division Five, found the existence 
of Colorado Rule of Evidence 803(22) was an argument supporting a 
finding of conclusive issue preclusion in A -1 Auto Repair & Detail, 
Inc. v. Bilunas-Hardy.164 InA-1 Auto Repair, the court found identical 
issues underlying the antecedent criminal case resulting in a 
conviction for conversion and the subsequent civil proceeding 
157. FED. Clv. Jun. PROC. & R. 454 (West 2005). 
158. See supra note 3; but see N.H. R. Evm. 803 Reporter's Notes ("[T]he Committee 
believes that the issue of whether to admit a judgment of prior conviction after a not 
guilty plea is not one that should be addressed at the present time as a hearsay exception. 
Rather, it depends on substantive principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata and 
should be determined by the courts and/or the Legislature."). 
159. Klein v. State, 52 Md. App. 640,648,452 A.2d 173, 178 n.3 (1982). 
160. /d. 
161.318 Md. 235,567 A.2d 937 (1990). 
162. /d. at 239, 567 A.2d at 939 (explaining that double jeopardy became a factor only at 
fourth trial: at first trial defendant was convicted on 5 of 8 counts but was granted a 
motion for a new trial; second trial resulted in hung jury, third trial was declared a 
mistrial). 
163. /d. at 245-46, 567 A.2d at 942. 
164. 93 P.3d 598, 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). 
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resulting from the same events. 165 The defendant in both actions had 
been convicted of conversion of cash payments to her employer. 166 
The court methodically evaluated the facts underlying the conviction 
to determine whether issue had been actually litigated and was 
necessary to the earlier proceeding, that there had been a judgment on 
the merits, that Bilunas-Hardy was a party to the earlier proceeding, 
and that she had had an opportunity to fully litigate the issue. 167 Upon 
a determination that all the above factors were present in the earlier 
proceeding, the court held the earlier conviction had conclusive effect 
to the subsequent motion by the plaintiff in the civil trial for summary 
judgment and affirmed the trial court's ruling for the plaintiff. 168 A-1 
Auto Repair illustrates a methodology for a sound determination of 
appropriate treatment of underlying issues. 
B. Relevancy and Prejudice 
Questions of relevancy, materiality, and weight of the evidence all 
fall readily under the superior rules of § 5-401 169 (Definition of 
"Relevant Evidence") and § 5-403 170 (Exclusion of Relevant Evidence 
on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time) and may be 
managed by the trial judge. The trial judge has existing rules at her 
d. 1 . 1 171 . 1" 172 d . . h h tsposa govemmg re evancy, matena tty, an gtvmg er t e 
power to weigh the probative value against the prejudicial effect. 173 
In Kowalski v. Gagne/ 74 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit weighed the relevance of a murder conviction, as 
evidence in a wrongful death suit for damages arising from the same 
event, against the prejudicial effect of the evidence. 175 Defendant 
165./d. at 602-03. 
166. /d. at 600. 
167. /d. at 602. 
168. /d. at 602, 605. 
169. Mo. RULE 5-401 (2004) ("Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."). 
170. Mo. RULE 5-403 (2004) ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."). 
171. Mo. RULE 5-401 (2004). 
172. See LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 63 (2d ed. 2002) ("Rule 5-401 
defines 'relevance' by collapsing common law relevance and materiality into one term."). 
173. Mo. RULE 5-403 (2004). 
174. 914 F.2d 299 (1st Cir. 1990). 
175. /d. at 305. 
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Gagne challenged the conviction's relevance as to damages in the civil 
case and also contended that the prejudicial impact of the conviction 
outweighed any probative value. 176 As to relevance, the court 
concluded that because the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, it 
was applying related damages to the degree of culpability, that it could 
"think of few things more relevant to the question of culpability than a 
defendant's conviction of second degree murder for the conduct that 
caused the wrongful death. "177 The court also dismissed the challenge 
regarding prejudice, stating the lower court "properly could have 
concluded that any prejudice caused by the evidence of defendant's 
murder conviction was more than outweighed by the relevancy of the 
evidence to the question of defendant's blameworthiness for the 
k'll' ,178 1 mg. 
The proposed rule yields to the threshold rules regarding relevancy 
and prejudice. The proposed rule would admit the conviction merely 
as evidence. The party against whom the conviction would be offered 
has the same opportunity to challenge admissibility as applies to all 
other forms of evidence. 
C. Appropriate Sentencing Threshold to Trigger the Rule 
Questions regarding what level of sentence triggers the application 
of the hearsay exception may be resolved by examining the degree to 
which the relevant issues are litigated in the prior criminal proceeding. 
The proposed rule would join sixteen other states179 in adopting the 
language of the federal rule regarding the type of sentence that would 
permit the conviction to be admissible as a hearsay exception. The 
proposed rule thereby sets a standard that insures a high probability 
that the criminal defendant will fully litigate the underlying issues. It 
is essential that the party against whom the evidence is offered had 
been fully motivated to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. The 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the earlier proceeding 
legitimately allows the civil court to begin a balancing test as to the 
weight of the evidence. 
A criminal charge that may result in a sentence of one year or 
longer (or death), sets a convenient departure point to presume that a 
176. ld. 
177. ld. at 306. 
178. ld. 
179. Ark., Colo., Haw., Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Mich., Minn., Miss., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.M., 
Ohio, Okla., Utah; see supra note 3. 
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defendant will make the utmost effort in his own defense. Under the 
proposed rule, a first time conviction for sex offense in the fourth 
degree would not be admissible in a subsequent civil suit by a 
victim. 180 If, however, the defendant was a two-time loser for the 
same offense, the second conviction would be admissible181 to help 
prove the facts essential to sustain the conviction in a subsequent suit. 
Another example of an admissible conviction would be a conviction 
for causing a life-threatening injury by vehicle while intoxicated.182 A 
conviction for driving under the influence, or under the influence per 
se, second offense (and upwards) would be admissible. 183 Convictions 
for driving under the influence, or under the influence per se, first 
offense, 184 or driving while impaired by alcohol, subsequent, 185 would 
not fall within the rule. The proposed rule appropriately matches the 
severity of its potential consequences with more egregious antecedent 
circumstances. 
Convictions resulting from means other than a trial should be given 
effect proportionally to circumstances giving rise to the conviction. 186 
An informed guilty plea is an acknowledgement of the existence of the 
underlying facts. 187 Admissibility of a plea accompanied by an agreed 
statement of facts should be reviewed under a "totality of the 
circumstances" test which establishes that the plea has not been 
motivated by exigencies forcing the hand of the pleader. 188 A plea of 
nolo contendere should remain beyond the reach of the rule for the 
180. Md. State Comm'n on Criminal Sentencing, Sentencing Guidelines Offense Table), 
http://www.msccsp.org/guidelines/ AppendixA-2005.pdf, 35 (classifying offense as a 
misdemeanor, maximum punishment available: one year) (updated Mar. 28, 2005). 
181. Id (classifying offense as a misdemeanor, maximum punishment available: three years). 
182. Id (classifying offense as a misdemeanor, maximum punishment available: three years). 
183. Id (classifying offense as a misdemeanor, maximum punishment available: two years). 
184. Id (classifying offense as a misdemeanor, maximum punishment available: one year). 
185. /d. 
186. See, e.g., Briggeman v. Albert, 322 Md. 133, 136,586 A.2d 15, 16 (1991) ("The payment 
of a traffic fine is neither a guilty plea nor an express acknowledgment of guilt; it is at 
most a consent to conviction, closely analogous to a plea of nolo contendere."). 
187. See Sutton v. State, 289 Md. 359,364,424 A.2d 755, 758 (1981). ("An acceptable guilty 
plea is an admission of conduct that constitutes all the elements of a formal criminal 
charge."). 
188. See, e.g., Yanes v. State, 52 Md. App. 150, 448 A.2d 359 (1982) (reversing trial court's 
conviction on a plea of not guilty with an agreed statement of facts, in part because the 
trial court had not complied with then existing MD. RuLE 731 (c), predecessor to Mo. 
RuLE 4-242, creating a liability for the defendant, who had in effect plead guilty to the 
charge with no finding on the record that the defendant had been made aware of the 
consequences.). 
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simple reason that existence of the underlying facts will not have been 
fully litigated. 189 
D. Procedural Questions Resolved in Light of the Higher Burden 
Placed on the Criminal Court 
Questions regarding procedural issues, nature of the results, and 
competency of witnesses, may be resolved by the higher burden of 
proof in a criminal trial. Minnesota's Committee Notes accompanying 
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 803(22) make the strong statement that 
the rule "represents a belief in the trustworthiness of verdicts based on 
the reasonable doubt standard." Also, the logic of the Supreme Court 
of Virginia in Heller is compelling. Addressing the issue specifically 
the Minnesota court indicated that the higher burden of proof lent 
credence to utilization of the finding in a court with a lesser 
standard. 190 
The Colorado Court of Appeals, Fifth Division, in A-1 Auto Repair 
articulates a strong argument for respecting the integrity of the 
criminal judgment: 
To preclude a civil litigant from re-litigating an issue 
previously found against him in a criminal prosecution 
is less severe than to preclude him from re-litigating 
such an issue in successive civil trials, for there are 
rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including 
the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
and of a unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a 
record paid for by the state on appeal. Stability of 
judgments and expeditious trials are served and no 
injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped 
from re-litigating issues determined in conformity with 
these safegaurds. 191 
189. See Thomas C. Hayden, Jr., Comment: The Plea of Nolo Contendere, 25 MD. L. REv. 
227, 233 (1965) ("Although the plea acts as an admission of guilt for the purpose of the 
case, it is uniformly recognized that the plea does not estop the defendant to deny the 
facts upon which the prosecution was based in a subsequent civil suit."). 
190. Heller, 140 S.E. at 316 (Va. 1927) ("This reason, however, seems to fail where there is a 
conviction, and the fact of guilt (when it is also the precise fact in issue in the civil case) 
has been judicially determined, because the plaintiff in the civil action is only bound to 
prove that fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, as the greater includes 
the less, we can see no logical reason, considering the question from this point of view, 
why the conviction should not be admissible, certainly as relevant evidence for the 
consideration ofthejury.") (emphasis added). 
191. A-1 Auto Repair, 93 P.3d at 601. 
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Of course the rule proposed is not asking for the strict remedy of issue 
preclusion. The logic that successfully argues for the more substantial 
effect of a prior judgment certainly applies to a proposal for a lesser 
effect of a previous conviction. The rule proposes a smaller brush in 
the civil plaintiffs palette, but applied with the same standard of care. 
E. The Public Policy Argument for Changing the Common Law 
Questions regarding the departure from the common law are best 
answered from a public policy perspective. The Supreme Court of 
Arkansas in Zinger192 found itself in the position that this article asks 
the Court of Appeals to take. That position is to overrule a substantial 
line of cases. It is within the power of the Court of Appeals to 
establish an attainable standard for weighing the fairness and logic of 
the slayer's rule on behalf of the plaintiffs while protecting a 
defendant's rights through a rigorous multi-step evaluation of the prior 
litigation, including the nature of the underlying issue, the extent to 
which it was litigated, the probative value to the present litigation, and 
the possibility of prejudicial effect. Adoption of the rule would bring 
Maryland into accord with the vast majority of American jurisdictions. 
V. PROPOSED RULE 
The rule proposed by this article contemplates that the conviction is 
admissible merely as evidence and subject to challenge by the party 
against whom it is offered. Maryland should expand the admission of 
criminal convictions in subsequent civil proceedings so as to be 
considered as substantive proof of facts necessary to sustain the 
conviction. 
A. Draft Rule Proposal 
Judgment of a Previous Conviction. 
Evidence of a final judgment entered after a trial or 
upon a plea of guilty (but not a plea of nolo contendere) 
that adjudges a person guilty of a crime punishable by 
death or imprisonment in excess of one year, offered to 
prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but 
only after the court determines that the probative value 
of admitting this evidence outweighs the danger of 
unfair prejudice to the party against whom it is offered. 
192. 985 S.W.2d 737 (Ark. 1999). 
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In criminal cases the State may not offer evidence of a 
judgment against a person other than the accused, 
except for purposes of impeachment. The pendency of 
an appeal may be shown but does not preclude 
admissibility. 
Committee note: This rule does not affect Rule 5-609. 
This rule is not intended to have any effect on a 
statutory or common law requirement to show a prior 
conviction as an element of proof or as required to 
illuminate an offense or charge of a separate nature. 
51 
Emphasis is added where there is a substantive departure from the 
federal rule. 
Issues raised by the admissibility of evidence through this hearsay 
exception will have to withstand the tests identified in the language of 
the rule. The party against whom the evidence is offered will have had 
opportunity and motivation to fully litigate the issues. The issues will 
have been necessary to the antecedent proceeding and based on a 
conviction, will have necessarily been litigated. The standard of proof 
is higher in the prior proceeding. Relevancy is weighed against 
prejudicial effect. The party against whom it is offered has the 
opportunity to explain or rebut the implications of the evidence. The 
proposed rule expresses confidence in criminal judgments and 
reinforces the integrity of the fact-finding process. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Case law in Maryland precludes the admissibility of a criminal 
conviction, as a hearsay exception, as substantive evidence of the facts 
necessary to sustain the conviction in a subsequent civil trial. This 
position is out of step with federal courts and three-quarters of the 
other states that recognize a hearsay exception under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(22) or similar rules. Legitimate concerns exist in 
finding a balance between the concept of fairness to the plaintiff 
injured by a criminal activity and protection of a defendant's right to a 
proceeding untainted by overtly prejudicial evidence. 
The rationale expressed in the case law and the concerns of the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland raised during earlier rules adoption 
proceedings may be addressed by adopting a modified version of the 
federal rule. The logical underpinning of the slayer's rule, holding 
that the convicted defendant should not subsequently be able to profit 
from his crime, argues for an expansion of the rule. The standards 
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required for evaluating appropriate use of collateral estoppel, if 
utilized by analogy, when weighing the admissibility of a prior 
conviction, help to insure that the evidence is of value. 
